所属 立命館アジア太平洋大学 国際経営学部 職種 助教
|標題||CONFLICTING INTERESTS: GOING PUBLIC IN DETERIORATING MARKET CONDITIONS|
|掲載誌名||Corporate Ownership and Control|
|著者・共著者||Pengda Fan, Lin Wang , Thanh Nguyen Thi Phuong|
|概要||The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the conflicting interest between issuing firms and CEOs (venture capitalists) affect the going-public decision. Going public in deteriorating market conditions is costly for issuing firms in terms of low offering price and high probability of withdrawal. If agency costs exist, agents pursuing their own interests may bring firms public even in poor market conditions, which has been largely ignored in the previous literature.|
To examine our hypotheses, we collect 1246 Japanese firms going public from 2001 to 2016 and conduct logit regressions, propensity score matching (PSM) as well as a probit model with sample selection. Consistent with our conjecture, we find a positive relation between the going-public decision and secondary shares offered by CEOs. Additionally, we also find an inverse U-shaped relationship between CEOs’ retained ownership and the going-public decision, indicating that in addition to liquidity needs, private benefits of control is another potential source of conflicting interests. Furthermore, secondary shares offered by VCs are also positively associated with the going-public decision, suggesting that when VCs attempt to exit as rapidly as possible, they are more likely to bring firms public even in deteriorating markets. These findings suggest that conflicting interests among parties affect the timing and costs of IPOs.